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Legal Aspects of Bilateral Arms Control Treaties
Thomas Graham, Jr. *
Edward ift**
Recent Trends
At no time in history has the arms control agenda been as busy
or as promising as it is today. It includes a wide variety of both bilat-
eral and multilateral negotiations, several of which either should lead
or have led to extremely important agreements.I The dramatic and
promising events which are occurring in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe have opened up possibilities in the arms control arena
which seemed remote only a short time ago. The two most obvious
areas in which these possibilities have manifested themselves are the
depth of reductions in armed forces and the degree of intrusiveness
of verification measures which can be achieved.
At the same time that these remarkable possibilities appeared,
the perceived need for formal arms control agreements, at least
among some segments of public opinion, decreased. This is an in-
teresting paradox. When tensions are great and public perception of
the threat is high, the public demand for arms control is strong; but
this is also when the successful conduct of arms control negotiations
is most difficult. On the other hand, when the real or perceived
threat is low, public demand for arms control falls off just when vig-
orous pursuit of sound arms control agreements is most likely to be
successful. Thus, one can hear the argument made today that per-
haps there is no need for painstaking negotiations leading to formal
treaties with long-term obligations and elaborate and effective verifi-
cation provisions.
Fortunately, the enlightened leaderships of all the principal
countries in the arms control process have correctly understood the
importance of seizing the opportunity to establish formal and legally
* General Counsel, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and rep-
resentative to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe negotiations.
** Senior State Department Representative, United States Delegation to Strategic
Arms Reductions Talks.
I For example, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations (treaty signed in Paris, France on November
18, 1990), and the U.S.-Soviet bilateral and multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons
(Cw).
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binding rules of international behavior that can form a powerful bar-
rier against possible future lapses into uncontrolled and destabilizing
forms of military competition. Security should be based upon legal
obligations, not upon unilateral actions, which can easily be re-
versed. A prudent person who repairs his roof when the sun is shin-
ing will provide himself with at least some protection against future
storms.
The Growing Complexity of Arms Control Agreements
Many of the lessons the authors have learned from years of in-
volvement in arms control negotiations apply equally well to both
bilateral and multilateral fora. This Article, however, will specifically
address bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control negotiations, which have
been largely limited to the nuclear field. When one considers the
progression of such agreements, from the Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 2 and the SALT I Interim Offensive
Agreement of 19723 to the current efforts, one trend immediately
stands out. This is the steady growth in both the complexity of these
agreements and the length of time needed to consummate them.
The two 1972 agreements were each only four pages in length, with
a few Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. 4 Agreed
Statements in 1972 were subsidiary obligations of a more technical
nature related to the two Agreements and initialed on the date of
signature of the Agreements by the two negotiators. 5 Common Un-
derstandings were simply formal statements from the negotiating
record. 6 The Interim Agreement also had a short Protocol. 7 The
two agreements were negotiated concurrently by the same delega-
tions in about two and one-half years. This was considered a long
negotiation at the time.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty8 and the Peaceful Nuclear Ex-
plosions Treaty9 were negotiated in the middle 1970s and represent
2 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
3 Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
4 Id.; ABM Treaty, supra note 2.
.5 See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at 3456-57; Interim Agreement, supra note 3, at
3478-79.
(i Id.
7 See Interim Agreement, supra note 3, at 3469.
8 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Limitations of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,July 3, 1974, 71 DEP'T ST. BULL. 217
(1974) [hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty[.
Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 74 DEP'T ST. BULL.
802 (1976) [hereinafter Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty].
[VOL. 16
ARMS CONTROL'TREATY LAW
a step up the ladder of complexity, primarily because of the detailed
technical verification provisions contained in the Protocol to the
Treaty.' 0 These provisions proved to be insufficient to ensure effec-
tive verification, however, and the two sides had to work out long
and complicated additional technical Protocols to each Treaty.
These Protocols were signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on
June 2, 1990, and will enter into force along with these two
Treaties. '
The SALT II Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms' 2 required seven years of difficult negotiations, and in an effort
to be comprehensive and free from ambiguity, was long and com-
plex. It had attached to it nearly 100 Agreed Statements and Com-
mon Understandings.' 3 In 1975, when drafting work began on the
SALT II Treaty, the legal thinking relative to these forms had
evolved since 1972. As in 1972, Agreed Statements were intended to
be initialed by the negotiators and were designed to contain addi-
tional obligations of a technical nature. On the other hand, Com-
mon Understandings were to be conformed statements jointly read
into the plenary record and were to be used for agreed interpretative
matters. In the end, the distinction between the two became blurred
and they were all collected in a single document, while retaining
their association with specific provisions of the Treaty, and signed by
the two Presidents.' 4 There was also a Memorandum on agreed data
on arms covered by the SALT II Treaty as well as a Statement of
Principles for future negotiations. The SALT II Treaty was criticized
for a number of reasons, became caught up in the political debate in
1980, and was never ratified, although it was informally observed by
both sides from 1979 to 1986.
The highly successful INF Treaty of 198715 took six years of
U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations and, given that it addressed only a few
weapon systems and a small percentage of the nuclear forces of each
Party, was even more technical and complex.' 6 This was largely due
1o See Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 8, at 218.
' 1 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,June 2, 1990, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 867-68 (June 4, 1990); Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for
Peaceful Purposes, June 2, 1990, id.
12 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 24 (1979)
[hereinafter SALT II Treaty].
13 Id.
14 See SALT II Treaty, supra note 12.
15 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, entered
intoforce June 1, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 90 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
1 The INF Treaty addresses eight types of missile systems. Among others, it covers
intermediate-range missiles such as the U.S. Pershing Ii and the BGM-1096, and the So-
1991]
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to the dramatic new intrusive verification provisions. The Treaty
text itself is moderately complex, but much of the technical detail is
in the associated Protocols. These voluminous attachments contain
the detailed data base and the procedures for eliminating systems
and for carrying out on-site inspections.
The data base illustrates the growth in complexity in successive
agreements. For each missile system covered by the Treaty, the INF
data base sets forth comprehensive information on the numbers of
missiles, launchers, and support structures and equipment at each
deployment area and missile operating base (with coordinates) as
well as at non-deployed locations such as repair and storage facili-
ties. The data base also contains technical data relevant to each mis-
sile system. The data base in the SALT II Treaty consisted of
numbers in only ten categories, but this was considered a break-
through in openness at that time.' 7 The INF data base runs to sev-
enty-three pages and is accompanied by an even longer document
containing site diagrams and photographs.' 8 The START data base
is still more elaborate.
The INF Treaty did not employ the legal device of Agreed State-
ments and Common Understandings. Instead, everything was in-
cluded in the text of the Treaty and the attached Protocols, which
were included as "integral parts" of the Treaty. The Protocols were
given this status to emphasize their importance, although it was un-
derstood that if they were simply documents associated with the
Treaty, and not an integral part thereof, they would be equally le-
gally binding.
Because Protocols, such as the one on data, could be anticipated
to change frequently during the course of implementation, inclusion
of the Protocols as a formal part of the Treaty proper necessitated a
provision in the Treaty and Protocols that technical changes to these
Protocols to "improve the viability and effectiveness" of the Treaty
would not constitute amendments.' 9 Thus, the INF Treaty created
the novel legal form in which technical changes to documents, which
are integral parts of a treaty, are not considered to be amendments
subject to ratification. This is, of course, in addition to subsequent
implementing agreements which also do not constitute amendments.
It should be noted that, in spite of the considerable technical
detail in the INF Treaty, the two parties labored for another two
viet Union's RSD-10, R-12, and R-14. Shorter-range missiles included in the Treaty's pro-
visions are the U.S. Pershing IA, and the Soviet Union's OTR-22 and OTR-23. Id.
17 SALT II Treaty, Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, repinted in 18 I.L.M. 1137 (1979).
18 INF Treaty, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the
Data Base, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 98 (1988).
1) INF Treaty, supra note 15, art. XIII, para. I(b), at 97; Protocol Regarding Inspec-
tions, § XI(4), id. at 198; Protocol on Procedures, § V, id. at 189.
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years after the Treaty had been ratified to work out a 150-page Mem-
orandum of Agreement 20 containing additional detailed procedures
to be followed in implementing the Treaty's verification provisions.
Most of these additional procedures were classic implementing
agreements, but a few changes to the Treaty text were made pursu-
ant to the "viability and effectiveness" provisions. All this was some-
what ironic since, during the two years in which the negotiators in
Geneva were working out these detailed procedures, the two parties
were proceeding to carry out their treaty obligations quite success-
fully. This is not to say that the work of the two delegations during
the 1988-1989 period was in vain. Rather it illustrates that, if there is
sufficient goodwill among the parties, the lack of highly detailed
agreed procedures can be overcome. Such procedures do serve,
however, as a safeguard against the possibility that a lack of trust and
goodwill could threaten compliance in the future.
When the Reagan administration entered the START negotia-
tions in 1982, there was a determination to avoid the "fatal flaws" of
the SALT II Treaty. Thus, one of the early U.S. goals was to pro-
duce a relatively simple treaty-one which could be readily under-
stood by the man in the street and which was not festooned like a
Christmas tree with the myriad Agreed Statements and Common Un-
derstandings that had so encumbered the SALT II Treaty. This
seems like a highly naive goal now. The START Treaty-nine years
in the making-is by a wide margin the most complicated arms con-
trol document ever negotiated. Though the Treaty text proper will
be perhaps 100 pages in length and as readable as the two sides can
possibly make it, the total document will be well over 800 pages in
length and probably beyond the comprehension of the average
adult. The INF model of having protocols integral to the treaty is
utilized and expanded upon in the START Treaty.
Although lawyers are trained to take such documents in stride,
the point is clear. The trend in both the complexity of arms control
agreements, and the time and effort required to conclude them, is a
fact of life. The reasons why these agreements require such long
periods of negotiations are beyond the scope of this Article, though
the great complexity and sensitivity of the subject matter itself obvi-
ously are major factors.
One unfortunate effect of such protracted periods of negotia-
tions is that the diplomats are simply overtaken by the rapid pace of
military technology. Thus, problems that one or both sides set out
to solve can easily become uncontrollable or unsolvable if the talks
20 1NF Treaty, Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the
Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, December 1989.
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stretch out over many years. A general recognition of this problem
could lead in the future to relatively short negotiations to deal with
selected aspects of the arms control universe, rather than attempting
to digest huge bites all at once. Once we have a START Treaty in
place, it would not be too difficult from a technical point of view to
amend it from time to time as discrete issues are resolved. This
would be preferable to replacing the START Treaty with an even
more complicated treaty emanating from a second phase of START.
At the 1990 Washington summit, the two sides agreed to begin
future talks on strategic arms "at the earliest practical date" follow-
ing the signing of the Treaty, 2' which probably means sometime
shortly after entry into force. In future agreements on strategic of-
fensive arms, the sides may be able to make good use of the detailed
on-site inspection procedures, as well as the procedures for con-
verting or eliminating strategic weapons systems and their compo-
nents worked out in the START Treaty. Thus, specific numbers of
categories of weapons systems could be lowered, new limitations es-
tablished, and so on, without renegotiating these various proce-
dures. This would be a major saving in time and effort.
Compliance Issues
Probably no aspect of arms control agreements attracts greater
attention, at least in the West, than the subject of compliance. Dur-
ing the negotiation and ratification process, the issue of whether or
not a given provision can be verified is crucial. After the agreement
enters into force, the question of whether or not the other party is
violating a given provision can be a major political issue, with serious
consequences for international relations. If a determination is made
that a violation has occurred, the issue of an appropriate response is
immediately raised and is generally not easy to answer.
For several years, the President of the United States has been
required to submit to Congress an annual "Compliance Report." 22
This Report, which has both classified and unclassified versions, lays
out in some detail any violations, probable violations, and possible
violations that the Administration has determined the Soviet Union
has committed.
The Soviet Union traditionally demonstrated far less concern
with verification than Western states. This began to change, how-
ever, during the negotiation of the INF Treaty, as a result of the
more open political structures emerging in Moscow. Thus, members
of the Supreme Soviet and Congress of Peoples' Deputies have be-
gun to show interest in the verifiability of agreements, and current
21 Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further
Enhancing Strategic Stability, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 864 (June 4, 1990).
22 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 583 (1986).
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Soviet negotiators by no means adopt the entirely defensive stance
of their predecessors on questions of verification. This is apparent in
the START negotiations as well as the multilateral negotiations on
Conventional Armed Forces in Vienna and Chemical Weapons in
Geneva.
The Role of Ambiguity
The ideal agreement would have no ambiguities in its provisions
and compliance with all of these unambiguous provisions would be
verifiable with 100 percent confidence. This is obviously not possi-
ble in the real world of arms control. Several examples from earlier
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements are instructive.
Generally, extraordinary efforts are made to avoid ambiguity,
but these cannot always be successful. Probably the most celebrated
case of ambiguity is the provision in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963 which prohibits any nuclear explosion that "causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. ' 23 The
English word "debris" is interpreted to include gaseous radioactive
debris, but the Russian word having equal status (osadhi) is inter-
preted to mean particulate debris. This linguistic difference has had
unfortunate consequences with many charges and denials of viola-
tions over the years.
Another interesting case of ambiguity was intentional and was
basically a calculated risk. In the SALT II negotiations, the United
States wanted to ban the encryption of telemetry24 transmitted dur-
ing flight tests of ballistic missiles, but the Soviet side refused to
agree. The parties finally settled on an ambiguous formulation inter-
preting the provision prohibiting "deliberate concealment measures
which impede verification by national technical means of verification
with the provisions of this Treaty." 25 This clearly papered over a
difficult and sensitive issue and one can assume both sides under-
23 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. 1, para. I(g), 14 U.S.T. 1313 (1963) [hereinafter Limited
Test Ban Treaty].
24 Encryption is "the act or process of enciphering or encoding." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 746 (1976). A telemeter is defined as "an instrument...
for measuring the distance of an object from an observer or ... an electrical apparatus for
measuring a quantity, transmitting the result to a distant station, and there indicating or
recording the quantity measured." Id. at 2350. Telemetry in the context of ballistic mis-
sile testing involves a signal containing internal measurements of performance transmitted
from the missile in flight to ground stations.
25 SALT II Treaty, Second Common Understanding, art. XV, para. 2, reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1156 (1979):
Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric informa-
tion during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall
engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the
19911
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stood that. The problem left unresolved was that there was no
agreement on whether specific measures would or would not impede
verification. The worst case did occur-the Soviet Union increased
the encryption of telemetry on its newest ballistic missiles, the
United States charged a violation, and the Soviets rejected the
charge on the grounds that the practice did not impede verification.
The natural reaction to this bit of history is to say that the nego-
tiators made a mistake in including in the Treaty an ambiguous pro-
vision which they knew had a good chance of leading to compliance
problems. This may be the correct assessment and a useful lesson
for the future.
There is, however, another view of the issue. Unlike the case of
the "radioactive debris" noted earlier, which was evidently due to
carelessness, the sides in this instance were taking a calculated risk
with full knowledge of the possible consequences. At least from the
U.S. perspective, the alternative to the ambiguous provision was no
provision at all, which would have essentially legalized the offending
practice. The agreed formulation, imperfect though it was, did allow
the practice to be challenged and might have provided some re-
straint on subsequent behavior if the SALT II Treaty had been rati-
fied and entered into force.
In any case, the story should have a happy ending, since, with
the entire weight of the history of this issue on their shoulders, the
sides are working out an unambiguous and effective prohibition on
telemetry encryption in the START Treaty.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 provides another useful
example of intentional ambiguity. The central provision of this
treaty limited the yield of underground nuclear weapons explosions
to no more than 150 kilotons. 26 Because it is impossible even for the
designers of such devices to predict exactly the yield, the sides
agreed, in a bilateral conversation held some months after the signa-
ture of the Treaty, that one or two "slight, unintended breaches" of
the 150 kiloton limit in any given year would not be considered a
violation. 27 "Slight" and "unintended" are not terms one would
like to see in international arms control obligations. Nevertheless,
they served a purpose in this context and have never caused a
problem.
The general point to be made is that clarity and precision are
usually highly desirable in arms control agreements. There may be
instances, however, in which this standard may not be achievable or
use of telemetric encryption, wherever such denial impedes verification of
compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Id.
26 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 8, art. I, para. 1, at 217.
27 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS 186 (6th ed. 1990).
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even desirable. Such questions must evidently be dealt with on a
case-by-case basis.
In some cases there may be no ambiguity in the agreement, but
the agreement may not provide concrete or detailed criteria for the
application of broad provisions. In such a case normal legal rules of
interpretation are followed. The most celebrated violation of such
an agreement was the large radar built by the U.S.S.R. near Krasno-
yarsk in Eastern Siberia.
The United States formally charged the Soviet Union with a vio-
lation of the ABM Treaty in 1984 soon after the radar near Krasno-
yarsk was detected.28 The ABM Treaty provides that new large
phased-array radars (of which this radar is certainly one) which are
not ABM battle management radars but rather are for purposes of
early warning of missile attack must be built on the periphery of the
national territory and oriented outward.2 9 This is to minimize their
use as ABM radars. The radar near Krasnoyarsk is not located on
the periphery of the national territory and it is oriented inward
across Siberia. The Soviets~claimed the radar, which never reached
operational status, was for space tracking. This claim attempted to
exploit the fact that the ABM Treaty provided an exemption for ra-
dars for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space, but failed to
establish criteria for distinguishing these from radars constrained by
the Treaty.30 However, this Soviet attempt to exploit an ambiguity
in the Treaty lacked credibility.
The issue remained such a serious one that the United States
finally declared that it would not sign further agreements on strate-
gic arms until it was satisfactorily resolved. 3' In a most unusual re-
versal, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze formally admitted to the
Supreme Soviet in 1989 that the Krasnoyarsk radar had indeed been
a violation of the ABM Treaty and promised to dismantle it.32 This
highly positive development is a welcome change from the usual
practice in which a party in violation of an arms control agreement
may, in the best case, correct its offending actions, but without ad-
mitting a violation.
Compliance Fora and the Handling of Disputes
A fundamental starting point in thinking about bilateral arms
control agreements is that they are self-enforcing. There is no court
28 Message to the Congress Transmitting the President's Report on Soviet Noncom-
pliance with Arms Control Agreements and a Fact Sheet, 20 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 73,
76 (Jan. 23, 1984).
29 ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI, para. b, at 3442.
30 ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement F, at 3457.
31 Message to Congress Transmitting the President's Report on Soviet Noncompli-
ance with Arms Control Agreements, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1579 (Dec. 2, 1988).
32 Pravda, Oct. 24, 1989 (2d ed.), at 2-4.
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with legal jurisdiction in such matters, nor is mediation by a third
party or parties an option that appeals to either the United States or
the Soviet Union. There are good reasons for this. The matters
under consideration are highly sensitive ones affecting each coun-
try's national security. In addition, the means by which the relevant
data were gathered could, if revealed to third parties, compromise
important intelligence sources and methods.
There have been suggestions put forward from time to time that
multilateral verification mechanisms could be applied to bilateral
agreements. One could, for example, imagine on-site inspection
teams that include nationals of third countries. The positive experi-
ence with International Atomic Energy Agency3 3 inspectors could
provide a precedent. In principle, one could argue that any violation
would be exposed to the whole world by respected third parties and
this could serve as a powerful deterrent to violations.
For the reasons noted above, it seems likely that verification and
compliance issues related to U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements will rest solely
in their own hands for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, other
countries could begin to influence these issues in the future, even
without the consent of the two parties. Many countries now have
sophisticated seismic capabilities. They might well have information
that could support or cast doubt upon a charge that a suspicious nu-
clear explosion violated a bilateral agreement on nuclear testing.
Likewise, as more and more countries acquire highly capable space-
based imaging systems, a similar situation could evolve in this area.
In any case, the goal of all those interested in the rule of law should
be to strengthen, make more reliable, and depoliticize multilateral
mechanisms for monitoring international arms control agreements,
whether or not they eventually have a role to play in bilateral
agreements.
Certain mechanisms created by the United States and the Soviet
Union to address compliance are well-established. The ABM Treaty
created the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). 34 The SCC
has a mixed record, successfully dealing with a number of disputes
and ambiguities in its early years, but becoming somewhat less effec-
tive in handling the Krasnoyarsk radar problem and certain other is-
sues arising from the SALT II Treaty that became significant political
issues. In the latter part of the Reagan administration more and
more reliance was placed on regular diplomatic channels and ap-
peals to public opinion to address compliance problems associated
with U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral arms control treaties. This policy proved
33 See generally Burns, Overview of U.S. Arms Control Objectives, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 43
(1989).
'4 ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII, at 3444.
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to be effective in the Krasnoyarsk case, but it increased the difficulty
of addressing this and other issues in the SCC.
Successive agreements are creating other compliance fora simi-
lar to the SCC. The INF Treaty created the Special Verification
Commission (SVC). 35 There will be a Joint Consultative Commis-
sion 36 to raise issues concerning the Threshold Test Ban and Peace-
ful Nuclear Explosion Treaties, and the START Treaty envisages a
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Some of these would
meet on a regular schedule, while others would meet only as neces-
sary. As agreements and fora for monitoring them proliferate, an
argument could be made for consolidating these fora into a single
high-level body in more-or-less permanent session to deal with such
matters.
Whether the sides end up with one such body or several, it is
important that they be effective. Naturally, such bodies will be only
as efficient and effective as the two sides jointly allow them to be.
The problem is that they will almost certainly encounter ambiguous
situations, differing interpretations of specific provisions, and honest
disagreements, as well as clean-cut issues that can be readily re-
solved. When difficult situations arise, if the relevant forum cannot
resolve the problem after a reasonable amount of time and effort, the
issue should be raised to a higher level and resolved. Allowing a
compliance problem to fester for years can only poison the atmos-
phere and undermine the legal foundations of arms control that have
been painstakingly constructed over many years.
Issues Related to On-Site Inspection
At Reykjavik in 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev agreed on the principle of intrusive on-site inspection for
the INF Treaty. 37 The INF Treaty is the first arms control agree-
ment in force with truly significant on-site inspection provisions.
The Antarctic Treaty of 196138 and the Outer Space Treaty of
196739 are two multilateral treaties which contain provisions for on-
site inspection, but these provisions are of marginal importance.
During the first year that the INF Treaty was in force, the United
States carried out some 200 inspections on the territory of the Soviet
Union, and the Soviet Union carried out a large number of inspec-
35 INF Treaty, supra note 15, art. XIII, at 97.
36 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, supra note 9, art. V, at 803.
-47 Statement to the United Nations First Committee by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter V.F. Petrovsky, Oct. 14, 1986, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 38-41, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/41/PV (1987).
38 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. I, 1959, art. VII, para. 1, 12 U.S.T. 794, 797, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, at 4.
" Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial BodiesJan. 27, 1967, art. XII, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 2415. T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 4.
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tions at United States bases in Western Europe and the United
States. The START Treaty will provide for many more such inspec-
tions with much more complex provisions than are contained in the
INF Treaty. On-site inspections are now very much a feature of de-
veloping international arms control law, being found in the develop-
ing multilateral Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Chemical
Weapons Treaties in addition to the START Treaty.
Two important legal questions with respect to on-site inspec-
tions are proprietary rights and access by inspectors to privately
owned facilities. Both are complicated and difficult questions when
considering something like a treaty banning chemical weapons, but
in the bilateral U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations they
are less significant.
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects private persons from unreasonable
searches and seizures, which means that unless there is a governmen-
tal connection, a warrant must be obtained to permit any official of
the government (and any foreign inspector) to enter a privately
owned facility. There are important legal procedures that must be
followed to obtain such a warrant, but the necessary time that would
be required would negate the value of any arms control inspection
which would require a warrant. This is not a serious problem in the
START context, however, as virtually all the privately owned facili-
ties which would be subject to inspections under the Treaty are
owned by business organizations which are under contract to the
government. Agreement to warrantless inspections can simply be
made a clause in the contract.
Appropriate protection of proprietary data is not as clear a mat-
ter. Presumably, an inspector from the Soviet Union could, in the
course of an inspection, become exposed to proprietary data. As a
practical matter, however, this is not a significant issue in the START
Treaty, in part because inspections largely will consist of simply
counting items and in part because of the limited degree of competi-
tion in manufacturing strategic offensive systems. "In addition, in-
spectors can be legally bound not to disclose information received
during inspections except under specified conditions. A provision to
this effect was included in the INF Treaty40 and can set a useful pre-
cedent for other agreements which provide for intrusive on-site
inspections.
Bilateral Versus Multilateral Treaties
This Article has examined problems associated with U.S.-Soviet
40 See U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 27, at 435 (history
and text of INF Treaty, Protocol Regarding Inspections, Dec. 8, 1988, § VI, para. 2).
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bilateral arms control treaties. A question often asked is whether
and how such treaties could be expanded to include other parties.
In answering this question, one should distinguish between nu-
clear testing treaties and treaties limiting strategic arms. It is un-
likely that either the Soviet Union or the United States would agree
to include third countries in agreements limiting U.S.-Soviet strate-
gic arms. These agreements are designed to establish stable U.S.-
Soviet balances in these systems and the introduction of third-coun-
try strategic systems would only greatly complicate this objective.
Nuclear testing agreements are another matter, however. The
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was negotiated among the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This Treaty now
has well over 100 parties. Likewise, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and its companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty after they
enter into force could be expanded to include the five nuclear pow-
ers should the three other nuclear weapon states be willing to under-
take these obligations.
Conclusion
This Article has examined some legal questions associated with
bilateral arms control treaties. As the law of international arms con-
trol continues to develop, more and more of these questions should
become settled. Quite complex and important issues are involved in
the U.S.-Soviet bilateral arms control process and the expansion and
strengthening of the relevant international law can only make the
process more effective.
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